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Slide Reduction, Revisited—
Filling the Gaps in SVP Approximation
Divesh Aggarwal∗ Jianwei Li† Phong Q. Nguyen‡ Noah Stephens-Davidowitz§
Abstract
We show how to generalize Gama and Nguyen’s slide reduction algorithm [STOC ’08] for
solving the approximate Shortest Vector Problem over lattices (SVP). As a result, we show
the fastest provably correct algorithm for δ-approximate SVP for all approximation factors
n1/2+ε ≤ δ ≤ nO(1). This is the range of approximation factors most relevant for cryptography.
1 Introduction
A lattice L ⊂ Rm is the set of integer linear combinations
L := L(B) = {z1b1 + · · ·+ znbn : zi ∈ Z}
of linearly independent basis vectors B = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Rm×n. We call n the rank of the lattice.
The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is the computational search problem in which the input is
(a basis for) a lattice L ⊆ Zm, and the goal is to output a non-zero lattice vector y ∈ L with minimal
length, ‖y‖ = λ1(L) := minx∈L 6=0 ‖x‖. For δ ≥ 1, the δ-approximate variant of SVP (δ-SVP) is the
relaxation of this problem in which any non-zero lattice vector y ∈ L 6=0 with ‖y‖ ≤ δ · λ1(L) is a
valid solution.
A closely related problem is δ-Hermite SVP (δ-HSVP, sometimes also called Minkowski SVP),
which asks us to find a non-zero lattice vector y ∈ L6=0 with ‖y‖ ≤ δ · vol(L)1/n, where vol(L) :=
det(BTB)1/2 is the covolume of the lattice. Hermite’s constant γn is (the square of) the minimal
possible approximation factor that can be achieved in the worst case. I.e.,
γn := sup
λ1(L)2
vol(L)2/n ,
where the supremum is over lattices L ⊂ Rn with full rank n. Hermite’s constant is only known
exactly for 1 ≤ n ≤ 8 and n = 24, but it is known to be asymptotically linear in n, i.e., γn = Θ(n).
HSVP and Hermite’s constant play a large role in algorithms for δ-SVP.
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Starting with the celebrated work of Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lova´sz in 1982 [LLL82], algorithms
for solving δ-(H)SVP for a wide range of parameters δ have found innumerable applications, includ-
ing factoring polynomials over the rationals [LLL82], integer programming [Len83, Kan83, DPV11],
cryptanalysis [Sha84, Odl90, JS98, NS01], etc. More recently, many cryptographic primitives have
been constructed whose security is based on the (worst-case) hardness of δ-SVP or closely related
lattice problems [Ajt96, Reg09, GPV08, Pei09, Pei16]. Such lattice-based cryptographic construc-
tions are likely to be used on massive scales (e.g., as part of the TLS protocol) in the not-too-distant
future [NIS18], and in practice, the security of these constructions depends on the fastest algorithms
for δ-(H)SVP, typically for δ = poly(n).
Work on δ-(H)SVP has followed two distinct tracks. There has been a long line of work showing
progressively faster algorithms for exact SVP (i.e., δ = 1) [Kan83, AKS01, NV08, PS09, MV13].
However, even the fastest such algorithm (with proven correctness) runs in time 2n+o(n) [ADRS15,
AS18]. So, these algorithms are only useful for rather small n.
This paper is part of a separate line of work on basis reduction algorithms [LLL82, Sch87, SE94,
GHKN06, GN08, HPS11, MW16]. (See [NV10] and [MW16] for a much more complete list of works
on basis reduction.) At a high level, these are reductions from δ-(H)SVP on lattices with rank n
to exact SVP on lattices with rank k ≤ n. More specifically, these algorithms divide a basis B into
projected blocks B[i,i+k−1] with block size k, where B[i,j] = (pii(bi), pii(bi+1), . . . , pii(bj)) and pii is
the orthogonal projection onto the subspace orthogonal to b1, . . . ,bi−1. Basis reduction algorithms
use their SVP oracle to find short vectors in these (low-rank) blocks and incorporate these short
vectors into the lattice basis B. By doing this repeatedly (at most poly(n, log ‖B‖) times) with a
cleverly chosen sequence of blocks, such algorithms progressively improve the “quality” of the basis
B until b1 is a solution to δ-(H)SVP for some δ ≥ 1. The goal, of course, is to take the block
size k to be small enough that we can actually run an exact algorithm on lattices with rank k in
reasonable time while still achieving a relatively good approximation factor δ.
For HSVP, the DBKZ algorithm due to Micciancio and Walter yields the best proven approxi-
mation factor for all ranks n and block sizes k [MW16]. Specifically, it achieves an approximation
factor of
δMW,H := γ
n−1
2(k−1)
k . (1)
(Recall that γk = Θ(k) is Hermite’s constant. Here and throughout the introduction, we have
left out low-order factors that can be made arbitrarily close to one.) Using a result due to
Lova´sz [Lov86], this can be converted into an algorithm for δ2MW,H -SVP. However, the slide re-
duction algorithm of Gama and Nguyen [GN08] achieves a better approximation factor for SVP. It
yields
δGN,H := γ
dnek−1
2(k−1)
k δGN,S := γ
dnek−k
k−1
k , (2)
for HSVP and SVP respectively, where we write dnek := k · dn/ke for n rounded up to the nearest
multiple of k. (We have included the result for HSVP in Eq. (2) for completeness, though it is
clearly no better than Eq. (1).)
The discontinuous approximation factor in Eq. (2) is the result of an unfortunate limitation of
slide reduction: it only works when the block size k divides the rank n. If n is not divisible by k,
then we must artificially pad our basis so that it has rank dnek, which results in the rather odd
expressions in Eq. (2). Of course, for n  k, this rounding has little effect on the approximation
factor. But, for cryptographic applications, we are interested in small polynomial approximation
factors δ ≈ nc for relatively small constants c, i.e., in the case when k = Θ(n). For such values of k
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and n, this rounding operation can cost us a constant factor in the exponent of the approximation
factor, essentially changing nc to ndce. Such constants in the exponent have a large effect on the
security of lattice-based cryptography.1
1.1 Our results
Our first main contribution is a generalization of Gama and Nguyen’s slide reduction [GN08] without
the limitation that the rank n must be a multiple of the block size k. Indeed, we achieve exactly
the approximation factor shown in Eq. (2) without any rounding, as we show below.
As a very small additional contribution, we allow for the possibility that the underlying SVP
algorithm for lattices with rank k only solves δ-approximate SVP for some δ > 1. This technique was
already known to folklore and used in practice, and the proof requires no new ideas. Nevertheless,
we believe that this work is the first to formally show that a δ-SVP algorithm suffices and to
compute the exact dependence on δ. (This minor change proves quite useful when we instantiate
our δ-SVP subroutine with the 20.802k-time δ-SVP algorithm for some large constant δ  1 due to
Liu, Wang, Xu, and Zheng [LWXZ11, WLW15]. See Table 1 and Figure 1.)
Theorem 1.1 (Informal, slide reduction for n ≥ 2k). For any approximation factor δ ≥ 1 and
block size k := k(n) ≥ 2, there is an efficient reduction from δH-HSVP and δS-SVP on lattices with
rank n ≥ 2k to δ-SVP on lattices with rank k, where
δH := (δ
2γk)
n−1
2(k−1) δS := δ(δ
2γk)
n−k
k−1 .
Notice in particular that this matches Eq. (2) in the case when δ = 1 and k divides n. (This is
not surprising, since our algorithm is essentially identical to the original algorithm from [GN08] in
this case.) Theorem 1.1 also matches the approximation factor for HSVP achieved by [MW16], as
shown in Eq. (1), so that the best (proven) approximation factor for both problems is now achieved
by a single algorithm.
However, Theorem 1.1 only applies for n ≥ 2k. Our second main contribution is an algorithm
that works for k ≤ n ≤ 2k. To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm that provably achieves
sublinear approximation factors for SVP and is asymptotically faster than, say, the fastest algorithm
for O(1)-SVP. (We overcame a small barrier here. See the discussion in Section 3.)
Theorem 1.2 (Informal, slide reduction for n ≤ 2k). For any approximation factor δ ≥ 1 and
block size k ∈ [n/2, n], there is an efficient reduction from δS-SVP on lattices with rank n to δ-SVP
on lattices with rank k, where
δS := δ
2√γk(δ2γq)
q+1
q−1 ·n−k2k . δ(δ2γk)
n
2k ,
and q := n− k ≤ k.
Together, these algorithms yield the asymptotically fastest proven running times for δ-SVP for
all approximation factors n1/2+ε ≤ δ ≤ nO(1)—with a particularly large improvement when δ = nc
for 1/2 < c < 1 or for any c slightly smaller than an integer. Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the
current state of the art.
1The security of lattice-based cryptography is actually assessed using heuristic algorithms that outperform Eq. (2)
empirically [APS15], so that Eq. (2) is not and should not be used directly for this purpose. In this work, we restrict
our attention to what we can prove.
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Approximation factor Previous best Folklore This work
Exact 2n [ADRS15] — —
Ω(1) ≤ δ ≤ √n 20.802n [WLW15] — —
nc for c ∈ [12 , 1] 20.802n [WLW15] — 2
0.802n
2c [*]+[WLW15]
nc for c ≥ 1 2 nbc+1c [GN08]+[ADRS15] 2 0.802nbc+1c [GN08]+[WLW15] 2 0.802nc+1 [*]+[WLW15]
Table 1: Algorithms for solving SVP. We write [A]+[B] to denote the algorithm that uses basis
reduction from [A] with the exact/near-exact SVP algorithm from [B], and we write [*] for this
work. The “folklore” column represents a result that was likely known to many experts in the field
but apparently never published.
[GN08]+[ADRS15][GN08]+[WLW15]
This work+[WLW15]
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
logn (δ)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
log2(T)
n
Figure 1: Running time T as a function of approximation factor δ for δ-SVP. The y-axis is log2(T )/n,
and the x-axis is logn δ.
1.2 Our techniques
We first briefly recall some of the details of Gama and Nguyen’s slide reduction. Slide reduction
divides the basis B = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Rm×n evenly into disjoint “primal blocks” B[ik+1,(i+1)k] of
length k. (Notice that this already requires n to be divisible by k.) It also defines certain “dual
blocks” B[ik+2,(i+1)k+1], which are the primal blocks shifted one to the right. The algorithm then
tries to simultaneously satisfy certain primal and dual conditions on these blocks. Namely, it tries
to SVP-reduce each primal block—i.e., it tries to make the first vector in the block b∗ik+1 a shortest
vector in L(B[ik+1,(i+1)k]), where b∗j := pij(bj). Simultaneously, it tries to dual SVP-reduce (DSVP-
reduce) the dual blocks. (See Section 2.3 for the definition of DSVP reduction.) We call a basis
that satisfies all of these conditions simultaneously slide-reduced.
An SVP oracle for lattices with rank k is sufficient to enforce all primal conditions or all dual
conditions separately. (E.g., we can enforce the primal conditions by simply finding a shortest
non-zero vector in each primal block and including this vector in an updated basis for the block.)
Furthermore, if all primal and dual conditions hold simultaneously, then ‖b1‖ ≤ δGN,Sλ1(L) with
δGN,S as in Eq. (2), so that ‖b1‖ yields a solution to δGN,S-SVP. This follows from repeated appli-
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Reduced Blocks
HSVP DHSVP SVP DSVP
b1
b∗k+q+1
b∗2k+q+1
b∗(p−1)k+q+1
b∗pk+q = b
∗
n
b1
b∗q+1
b∗k
b∗k+q = b
∗
n
Figure 2: Slide reduction of an upper-triangular matrix for n = pk+q ≥ 2k (left) and n = k+q ≤ 2k
(right). (The original notion of slide reduction in [GN08] used only SVP-reduced and DSVP-reduced
blocks of fixed size k.)
cation of a “gluing” lemma on such bases, which shows how to “glue together” two reduced block
to obtain a larger reduced block. (See Lemma 2.2.) Finally, Gama and Nguyen showed that, if
we alternate between SVP-reducing the primal blocks and DSVP-reducing the dual blocks, then
the basis will converge quite rapidly to a slide-reduced basis (up to some small slack) [GN08].
Combining all of these facts together yields the main result in [GN08]. (See Section 4.)
The case n > 2k. We wish to extend slide reduction to the case when n = pk + q for 1 ≤ q < k.
So, intuitively, we have to decide what to do with “the extra q vectors in the basis.”
We start by observing that the analysis of slide reduction (and, in particular, this “gluing”
property) does not quite require the first block B[1,k] to be SVP-reduced. Instead, it essentially
only requires it to be “HSVP-reduced.” I.e., we do not really need ‖b1‖ ≤ δSλ1(L(B[1,k])); we
basically only need ‖b1‖ ≤ δHvol(B[1,k])1/k. Something similar holds for the first dual block, so
that at least for the first block and the corresponding dual block, we basically only need an HSVP
oracle.2
This suggests that we might want to simply add the extra q vectors to the first block. I.e., we
can take one “big block” B[1,k+q] of length k + q, and p − 1 “regular” blocks B[ik+q+1,(i+1)k+q] of
length k. The regular blocks satisfy the same conditions as in [GN08]—they are SVP-reduced and
2We are ignoring a certain degenerate case here for simplicity. Namely, if all short vectors happen to lie in the
span of the first block, and these vectors happen to be very short relative to the volume of the first block, then
calling an HSVP oracle on the first block might not be sufficient to solve approximate SVP. Of course, if we know a
low-dimensional subspace that contains the shortest non-zero vector, then finding short lattice vectors is much easier.
This degenerate case is therefore easily handled separately (but it does in fact need to be handled separately).
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the corresponding dual blocks are DSVP-reduced. For the big first block, we replace SVP reduction
by an appropriate notion of HSVP reduction. Similarly, we replace DSVP reduction of the (big)
first dual block by the appropriate dual notion of HSVP reduction.
To get the best results, we instantiate our HSVP oracle with the algorithm from [MW16]. Since
we only need an oracle for HSVP, we are able to take advantage of the very impressive approximation
factor achieved by [MW16] for this problem (i.e., Eq. (1)). In fact, the approximation factor achieved
by [MW16] is exactly what we need to apply our gluing lemma. (This is not a coincidence, as we
explain in Section 4.) The result is Theorem 1.1.
The case n < 2k. For n = k + q < 2k, the above idea cannot work. In particular, a “big block”
of size k + q in this case would be our entire basis! So, instead of working with one big block and
some “regular blocks” of size k, we work with a “small block” of size q and one regular block of size
k. We then simply perform slide reduction with (primal) blocks B[1,q] and B[q+1,n] = B[n−k+1,n]. If
we were to stop here, we would achieve an approximation factor of roughly γq, which for q = Θ(k)
is essentially the same as the approximation factor of roughly γk that we get when the rank is 2k.
I.e., we would essentially “pay for two blocks of length k,” even though one block has size q < k.
However, we notice that a slide-reduced basis guarantees more than just a short first vector.
It also promises a very strong bound on vol(B[1,q]). In particular, since q < k and since we
have access to an oracle for lattices with rank k, it is natural to try to extend this small block
B[1,q] with low volume to a larger block B[1,k] of length k that still has low volume. Indeed,
we can use our SVP oracle to guarantee that B[q+1,k] consists of relatively short vectors so that
vol(B[q+1,k]) is relatively small as well. (Formally, we SVP-reduce B[i,n] for i ∈ [q + 1, k]. Again,
we are ignoring a certain degenerate case, as in Footnote 2.) This allows us to upper bound
vol(B[1,k]) = vol(B[1,q]) · vol(B[q+1,k]), which implies that λ1(L(B[1,k])) is relatively short. We can
therefore find a short vector by making an additional SVP oracle call on L(B[1,k]). (Micciancio and
Walter used a similar idea in [MW16].)
1.3 Open questions and directions for future work
Table 1 suggests an obvious open question: can we find a non-trivial basis reduction algorithm that
provably solves δ-SVP for δ ≤ O(√n)? More formally, can we reduce O(√n)-SVP on lattices with
rank n to exact SVP on lattices with rank k = cn for some constant c < 1. Our current proof
techniques seem to run into a fundamental barrier here in that they seem more-or-less incapable
of achieving δ  √γk. This setting is interesting in practice, as many record lattice computations
use block reduction with k ≥ n/2 as a subroutine, such as [CN12]. (One can provably achieve
approximation factors δ  √γk when k = (1 − o(1))n with a bit of work,3 but it is not clear if
these extreme parameters are useful.)
Next, we recall that this work shows how to exploit the existing very impressive algorithms
for HSVP (in particular, DBKZ [MW16]) to obtain better algorithms for SVP. This suggests two
closely related questions for future work: (1) can we find better algorithms for HSVP (e.g., for
δ-HSVP with δ ≈ √γn—i.e., “near-exact” HSVP); and (2) where else can we profitably replace
SVP oracles with HSVP oracles? Indeed, most of our analysis (and the analysis of other basis
3For example, it is immediate from the proof of Theorem 3.2 that the (very simple) notion of a slide-reduced basis
for n ≤ 2k in Definition 3.1 is already enough to obtain δ ≈ γn−k ≈ n− k. So, for n . k +
√
k, this already achieves
δ . √n. With a bit more work, one can show that an extra oracle call like the one used in Corollary 3.4 can yield a
still better approximation factor in this rather extreme setting of k = (1− o(1))n.
6
reduction algorithms) treats the δ-SVP oracle as a δ
√
γk-HSVP oracle. We identified one way to
exploit this to actually get a faster algorithm, but perhaps more can be done here—particularly if
we find faster algorithms for HSVP.
We also leave it to future work to implement our algorithms and to study how they perform
in practice. Indeed, Micciancio and Walter showed that (a slightly optimized version of) slide
reduction is competitive with even the best heuristic algorithms in practice, in terms of both the
running time and the approximation factor [MW16]. Since our algorithms are generalizations of
slide reduction, one might guess that they also perform well in practice. We leave it to others to
confirm or refute this guess.
Finally, we note that we present two distinct (though similar) algorithms: one for lattices with
rank n ≤ 2k and one for lattices with rank n ≥ 2k. It is natural to ask whether there is a single
algorithm that works in both regimes. Perhaps work on this question could even lead to better
approximation factors.
2 Preliminaries
We denote column vectors x ∈ Rm by bold lower-case letters. Matrices B ∈ Rm×n are denoted by
bold upper-case letters, and we often think of a matrix as a list of column vectors, B = (b1, . . . ,bn).
For a matrix B = (b1, . . . ,bn) with n linearly independent columns, we write L(B) := {z1b1+ · · ·+
znbn : zi ∈ Z} for the lattice generated by B and ‖B‖ = max{‖b1‖, . . . , ‖bn‖} for the maximum
norm of a column. We often implicitly assume that m ≥ n and that a basis matrix B ∈ Rm×n has
rank n (i.e., that the columns of B are linearly independent). We use the notation log := log2 to
mean the logarithm with base two.
2.1 Lattices
For any lattice L, its dual lattice is
L× = {w ∈ span(L) : 〈w,y〉 ∈ Z for all y ∈ L} .
If B ∈ Rm×n is a basis of L, then L× has basis B× := B(BTB)−1, called the dual basis of B. The
reversed dual basis B−s of B is simply B× with its columns in reversed order [GHN06].
2.2 Gram-Schmidt-Orthogonalization
For a basis B = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Rm×n, we associate a sequence of projections pii := pi{b1,...,bi−1}⊥ .
Here, piW⊥ means the orthogonal projection onto the subspace W
⊥ orthogonal to W . As in [GN08],
B[i,j] denotes the projected block (pii(bi), pii(bi+1), . . . , pii(bj)).
We also associate to B its Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization (GSO) B∗ := (b∗1, . . . ,b∗n), where
b∗i := pii(bi) = bi −
∑
j<i µi,jb
∗
j , and µi,j = 〈bi,b∗j 〉/‖b∗j‖2.
We say that B is size-reduced if |µi,j | ≤ 12 for all i 6= j: then ‖B‖ ≤
√
n‖B∗‖. Transforming a
basis into this form without modifying L(B) or B∗ is called size reduction, and this can be done
easily and efficiently.
7
2.3 Lattice basis reduction
LLL reduction. Let B = (b1, . . . ,bn) be a size-reduced basis. For ε ∈ [0, 1], we say that B
is ε-LLL-reduced [LLL82] if every rank-two projected block B[i,i+1] satisfies Lova´sz’s condition:
‖b∗i ‖2 ≤ (1 + ε)‖µi,i−1b∗i−1 + b∗i ‖2 for 1 < i ≤ n. For ε ≥ 1/poly(n), one can efficiently compute an
ε-LLL-reduced basis for a given lattice.
SVP reduction and its extensions. Let B = (b1, . . . ,bn) be a basis of a lattice L and δ ≥ 1
be an approximation factor.
We say that B is δ-SVP-reduced if ‖b1‖ ≤ δ ·λ1(L). Similarly, we say that B is δ-HSVP-reduced
if ‖b1‖ ≤ δ · vol(L)1/n.
B is δ-DSVP-reduced [GN08] (where D stands for dual) if the reversed dual basis B−s is δ-
SVP-reduced and B is 13 -LLL-reduced. Similarly, we say that B is δ-DHSVP-reduced if B
−s is
δ-HSVP-reduced.
The existence of such δ-DSVP-reduced bases is guaranteed by a classical property of LLL that
‖b∗n‖ never decreases during the LLL-reduction process [LLL82].
We can efficiently compute a δ-(D)SVP-reduced basis for a given rank n lattice L ⊆ Zm with
access to an oracle for δ-SVP on lattices with rank at most n. Furthermore, given a basis B =
(b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Zm×n of L and an index i ∈ [1, n−k+1], we can use a δ-SVP oracle for lattices with
rank at most k to efficiently compute a size-reduced basis C = (b1, . . . ,bi−1, ci, . . . , ci+k−1,bi+k, . . . ,bn)
of L such that the block C[i,i+k−1] is δ-SVP reduced or δ-DSVP reduced:
• If C[i,i+k−1] is δ-SVP-reduced, the procedures in [GN08, MW16] equipped with δ-SVP-oracle
ensure that ‖C∗‖ ≤ ‖B∗‖;
• If C[i,i+k−1] is δ-DSVP-reduced, the inherent LLL reduction implies ‖C∗‖ ≤ 2k‖B∗‖. Indeed,
the GSO of C[i,i+k−1] satisfies ‖(C[i,i+k−1])∗‖ ≤ 2k/2λk(L(C[i,i+k−1])) (by [LLL82, p. 518, Line
27]) and λk(L(C[i,i+k−1])) ≤
√
k‖B∗‖. Here, λk(·) denotes the k-th minimum.
With size-reduction, we can iteratively perform poly(n, log ‖B‖) many such operations effi-
ciently. In particular, doing so will not increase ‖B∗‖ by more than a factor of 2poly(n,log ‖B‖), and
therefore the same is true of ‖B‖. That is, all intermediate entries and the total cost during exe-
cution (excluding oracle queries) remain polynomially bounded in the initial input size; See, e.g.,
[GN08, LN14] for the evidence. Therefore, to bound the running time of basis reduction, it suffices
to bound the number of calls to these block reduction subprocedures.
Twin reduction and gluing. We define the following notion, which was implicit in [GN08] and
will arise repeatedly in our proofs. B = (b1, . . . ,bd+1) is δ-twin-reduced if B[1,d] is δ-HSVP-reduced
and B[2,d+1] is δ-DHSVP-reduced. The usefulness of twin reduction is illustrated by the following
fact, which is the key idea behind Gama and Nguyen’s slide reduction (and is remarkably simple
in hindsight).
Fact 2.1. If B := (b1, . . . ,bd+1) ∈ Rm×(d+1) is δ-twin-reduced, then
‖b1‖ ≤ δ2d/(d−1)‖b∗d+1‖ . (3)
Furthermore,
δ−d/(d−1)‖b1‖ ≤ vol(B)1/(d+1) ≤ δd/(d−1)‖b∗d+1‖ . (4)
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Proof. By definition, we have ‖b1‖d ≤ δdvol(B[1,d]), which is equivalent to
‖b1‖d−1 ≤ δdvol(B[2,d]) .
Similarly,
vol(B[2,d]) ≤ δd‖b∗d+1‖d−1 .
Combining these two inequalities yields Eq. (3).
Finally, we have ‖b1‖d‖b∗d+1‖ ≤ δdvol(B). Applying Eq. (3) implies the first inequality in
Eq. (4), and similar analysis yields the second inequality.
The following gluing lemma, which is more-or-less implicit in prior work, shows conditions on
the blocks B[1,d] and B[d+1,n] that are sufficient to imply (H)SVP reduction of the full basis B.
Notice in particular that the decay of the Gram-Schmidt vectors guaranteed by Eq. (3) is what is
needed for Item 2 of the lemma below, when η = δ1/(d−1). And, with this same choice of η, the
HSVP reduction requirement on B[1,d] in Fact 2.1 is the same as the one in Item 2 of Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2 (The gluing lemma). Let B := (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Rm×n, α, β, η ≥ 1, and 1 ≤ d ≤ n.
1. If B[d+1,n] is β-SVP-reduced, ‖b1‖ ≤ α‖b∗d+1‖, and λ1(L(B)) < λ1(L(B[1,d])), then B is
αβ-SVP-reduced.
2. If B[1,d] is η
d−1-HSVP-reduced, B[d+1,n] is ηn−d−1-HSVP-reduced, and ‖b1‖ ≤ η2d‖b∗d+1‖,
then B is ηn−1-HSVP-reduced.
Proof. For Item 1, since λ1(L(B)) < λ1(L(B[1,d])), there exists a shortest non-zero vector u ∈ L(B)
with ‖u‖ = λ1(L(B)) and pid(u) 6= 0. Since B[d+1,n] is β-SVP-reduced, it follows that ‖b∗d+1‖/β ≤
‖pid(u)‖ ≤ ‖u‖ = λ1(L(B)). Finally, we have ‖b1‖ ≤ α‖b∗d+1‖ ≤ αβλ1(L) as needed.
Turning to Item 2, we note that the HSVP conditions imply that ‖b1‖d ≤ ηd(d−1)vol(B[1,d]) and
‖b∗d+1‖n−d ≤ η(n−d)(n−d−1)vol(B[d+1,n]). Using the bound on ‖b1‖ relative to ‖b∗d+1‖, we have
‖b1‖n ≤ η2d(n−d)‖b1‖d · ‖b∗d+1‖n−d ≤ η2(n−d)d+d(d−1)+(n−d)(n−d−1)vol(B) = ηn(n−1)vol(B) ,
as needed.
2.4 The Micciancio-Walter DBKZ algorithm
We recall Micciancio and Walter’s elegant DBKZ algorithm [MW16], as we will need it later.
Formally, we slightly generalize DBKZ by allowing for the use of a δ-SVP-oracle. We provide only
a high-level sketch of the proof of correctness, as the full proof is the same as the proof in [MW16],
with Hermite’s constant γk replaced by δ
2γk.
Theorem 2.3. For integers n > k ≥ 2, an approximation factor 1 ≤ δ ≤ 2k, an input basis
B0 ∈ Zm×n for a lattice L ⊆ Zm, and N := d(2n2/(k − 1)2) · log(n log(5‖B0‖)/ε)e for some
ε ∈ [2−poly(n), 1], Algorithm 1 outputs a basis B of L in polynomial time (excluding oracle queries)
such that
‖b1‖ ≤ (1 + ε) · (δ2γk)
n−1
2(k−1)vol(L)1/n
by making N · (2n− 2k + 1) + 1 calls to the δ-SVP oracle for lattices with rank k.
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Algorithm 1 The Micciancio-Walter DBKZ algorithm [MW16, Algorithm 1]
Input: A block size k ≥ 2, number of tours N , a basis B = (b1, · · · ,bn) ∈ Zm×n, and access to a δ-SVP
oracle for lattices with rank k.
Output: A new basis of L(B).
1: for ` = 1 to N do
2: for i = 1 to n− k do
3: δ-SVP-reduce B[i,i+k−1].
4: end for
5: for j = n− k + 1 to 1 do
6: δ-DSVP-reduce B[j,j+k−1]
7: end for
8: end for
9: δ-SVP-reduce B[1,k].
10: return B.
Proof sketch. We briefly sketch a proof of the theorem, but we outsource the most technical step to
a claim from [MW16], which was originally proven in [Neu17]. Let B(`) be the basis immediately
after the `th tour, and let x
(`)
i := log vol(B
(`)
[1,k+i−1])− k+i−1n log vol(L) for i = 1, . . . , n− k. Let
yi :=
(n− k − i+ 1)(k + i− 1)
k − 1 · log(δ
√
γk) for i = 1, . . . , n− k .
By [MW16, Claim 3] (originally proven in [Neu17]), we have
max
1≤i≤n−k
∣∣x(`)i /yi − 1∣∣ ≤ (1− ξ) max
1≤i≤n−k
∣∣x(`−1)i /yi − 1∣∣ ,
where ξ := 1/(1 + n2/(4k(k − 1))) ≥ 4(k − 1)2/(5n2). Furthermore, notice that
max
1≤i≤n−k
∣∣x(0)i /yi − 1∣∣ ≤ k(n− k) log(5‖B(0)‖)y1 .
It follows that
x
(N)
1 − y1
y1
≤ (1− ξ)N max
1≤i≤n−k
∣∣x(0)i /yi − 1∣∣
≤ e−4(k−1)2N/(5n2) · k(n− k) log(5‖B
(0)‖)
y1
≤ k log(1 + ε)
y1
.
In other words,
vol
(
B
(N)
[1,k]
) ≤ (1 + ε)k · (δ2γk) (n−k)k2(k−1) vol(L)k/n .
Notice that the first vector b1 of the output basis is a δ-approximate shortest vector in L
(
B
(N)
[1,k]
)
.
Therefore,
‖b1‖ ≤ δ√γk · vol
(
B
(N)
[1,k]
)1/k ≤ (1 + ε)(δ2γk) n−12(k−1)vol(L)1/n ,
as needed.
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3 Slide reduction for n ≤ 2k
In this section, we consider a generalization of Gama and Nguyen’s slide reduction that applies to
the case when k < n ≤ 2k [GN08]. Our definition in this case is not particularly novel or surprising,
as it is essentially identical to Gama and Nguyen’s except that our blocks are not the same size.4
What is surprising about this definition is that it allows us to achieve sublinear approximation
factors for SVP when the rank is n = k + q for q = Θ(k). Before this work, it seemed that
approximation factors less than roughly γq ≈ n could not be achieved using the techniques of
slide reduction (or, for that matter, any other known techniques with formal proofs). Indeed, our
slide-reduced basis only achieves ‖b1‖ . γqλ1(L), which is the approximation factor resulting from
the gluing lemma, Lemma 2.2. (This inequality is tight.) We overcome this barrier by using our
additional constraints on the primal together with some additional properties of slide-reduced bases
(namely, Eq. (4)) to bound λ1(L(B[1,k])). Perhaps surprisingly, the resulting bound is much better
than the bound on ‖b1‖, which allows us to find a much shorter vector with an additional oracle
call.
Definition 3.1 (Slide reduction). Let n = k + q where 1 ≤ q ≤ k are integers. A basis B of a
lattice with rank n is (δ, k)-slide-reduced (with block size k ≥ 2 and approximation factor δ ≥ 1) if
it is size-reduced and satisfies the following set of conditions.
1. Primal conditions: The blocks B[1,q] and B[i,n] for i ∈ [q+1,max{k, q+1}] are δ-SVP-reduced.
2. Dual condition: the block B[2,q+1] is δ-DSVP-reduced.
A reader familiar with the slide reduction algorithm from [GN08] will not be surprised to learn
that such a basis can be found (up to some small slack) using polynomially many calls to a δ-SVP
oracle on lattices with rank at most k. Before presenting and analyzing the algorithm, we show
that such a slide-reduced basis is in fact useful for approximating SVP with sub-linear factors. (We
note in passing that a slight modification of the proof of Theorem 3.2 yields a better result when
q = o(k). This does not seem very useful on its own, though, since when q = o(k), the running
times of our best SVP algorithms are essentially the same for rank k and rank k + q.)
Theorem 3.2. Let L be a lattice with rank n = k+ q where 2 ≤ q ≤ k are integers. For any δ ≥ 1,
if a basis B of L is (δ, k)-slide-reduced, then,
λ1(L(B[1,k])) ≤ δ
√
γk(δ
2γq)
q+1
q−1 ·n−k2k λ1(L) .
Proof. Let B = (b1, . . . ,bn). We distinguish two cases.
First, suppose that there exists an index i ∈ [q+1,max{k, q+1}] such that ‖b∗i ‖ > δλ1(L). Let
v be a shortest non-zero vector of L. We claim that pii(v) = 0, i.e., that v ∈ L(B[1,i−1]). If this is
not the case, since B[i,n] is δ-SVP-reduced, we have that
‖b∗i ‖/δ ≤ ‖pii(v)‖ ≤ ‖v‖ = λ1(L),
which is a contradiction. Thus, we see that v ∈ L(B[1,i−1]) ⊆ L(B[1,k]), and hence λ1(L(B[1,k])) =
λ1(L) (which is much stronger than what we need).
4The only difference, apart from the approximation factor δ, is that we use SVP reduction instead of HKZ reduction
for the primal. It is clear from the proof in [GN08] that only SVP reduction is required, as was observed in [MW16].
We do require that additional blocks B[i,n] for q + 1 ≤ i ≤ k are SVP-reduced, which is quite similar to simply
HKZ-reducing B[q+1,n], but this requirement plays a distinct role in our analysis, as we discuss below.
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Now, suppose that ‖b∗i ‖ ≤ δλ1(L) for all indices i ∈ [q + 1,max{k, q + 1}]. By definition,
the primal and dual conditions imply that B[1,q+1] is δ
√
γq-twin-reduced. Therefore, by Eq. (4) of
Fact 2.1, we have
vol(B[1,k]) = vol(B[1,q]) ·
k∏
i=q+1
‖b∗i ‖
≤ (δ√γq)q(q+1)/(q−1))‖b∗q‖q ·
k∏
i=q+1
‖b∗i ‖
≤ (δ2γq)
q+1
q−1 ·n−k2 (δλ1(L))k ,
where we have used the assumption that ‖b∗i ‖ ≤ δλ1(L) for all indices i ∈ [q+1,max{k, q+1}] (and
by convention we take the product to equal one in the special case when q = k). By the definition
of Hermite’s constant, this implies that
λ1(L(B[1,k])) ≤
√
γkvol(B[1,k])
1/k ≤ δ√γk(δ2γq)
q+1
q−1 ·n−k2k λ1(L) ,
as needed.
3.1 The slide reduction algorithm for n ≤ 2k
We now present our slight generalization of Gama and Nguyen’s slide reduction algorithm that
works for all k + 2 ≤ n ≤ 2k.
Algorithm 2 The slide reduction algorithm for n ≤ 2k (adapted from [GN08, Algorithm 1])
Input: Block size k, slack ε > 0, approximation factor δ ≥ 1, a basis B = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Zm×n of a lattice
L with rank n = k + q where 2 ≤ q ≤ k, and access to a δ-SVP oracle for lattices with rank at most k.
Output: A ((1 + ε)δ, k)-slide-reduced basis of L.
1: while vol(B[1,q])
2 is modified by the loop do
2: δ-SVP-reduce B[1,q].
3: for i = q + 1 to max{k, q + 1} do
4: δ-SVP reduce B[i,n].
5: end for
6: Find a new basis C := (b1, c2, . . . , cq+1,bq+2, . . . ,bn) of L by δ-DSVP-reducing B[2,q+1].
7: if (1 + ε)‖b∗q+1‖ < ‖c∗q+1‖ then
8: B← C.
9: end if
10: end while
11: return B.
Our proof that Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial time (excluding oracle calls) is essentially iden-
tical to the proof in [GN08].
Theorem 3.3. For ε ≥ 1/poly(n), Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial time (excluding oracle calls),
makes polynomially many calls to its δ-SVP oracle, and outputs a ((1 + ε)δ, k)-slide-reduced basis
of the input lattice L.
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Proof. First, notice that if Algorithm 2 terminates, then its output must be ((1 + ε)δ, k)-slide-
reduced. So, we only need to argue that the algorithm runs in polynomial time (excluding oracle
calls).
Let B0 ∈ Zm×n be the input basis and let B ∈ Zm×n denote the current basis during the
execution of the algorithm. As is common in the analysis of basis reduction algorithms [LLL82,
GN08, LN14], we consider an integral potential of the form
P (B) := vol(B[1,q])
2 ∈ Z+ .
The initial potential satisfies logP (B0) ≤ 2q · log ‖B0‖, and every operation in Algorithm 2 either
preserves or significantly decreases P (B). More precisely, if the δ-DSVP-reduction step (i.e., Step
8) occurs, then the potential P (B) decreases by a multiplicative factor of at least (1+ε)2. No other
step changes L(B[1,q]) or P (B).
Therefore, Algorithm 2 updates L(B[1,q]) at most logP (B0)2 log(1+ε) times, and hence it makes at most
qk log ‖B0‖
log(1+ε) calls to the δ-SVP-oracle. From the complexity statement in Section 2.3, it follows that
Algorithm 2 runs efficiently (excluding the running time of oracle calls).
Corollary 3.4. For any constant c ∈ (1/2, 1] and δ := δ(n) ≥ 1, there is an efficient reduction
from O(δ2c+1nc)-SVP on lattices with rank n to δ-SVP on lattices with rank k := dn/(2c)e.
Proof. On input (a basis for) an integer lattice L ⊆ Zm with rank n, the reduction first calls
Algorithm 2 to compute a ((1+ε)δ, k)-slide-reduced basis B of L with, say, ε = 1/n. The reduction
then uses its δ-SVP oracle once more on B[1,k] and returns the resulting nonzero short lattice vector.
It is immediate from Theorem 3.3 that this reduction is efficient, and by Theorem 3.2, the
output vector is a δ′-approximate shortest vector, where
δ′ = δ2
√
γk((1 + ε)
2δ2γq)
q+1
q−1 ·n−k2k ≤ O(δ2c+1nc) ,
as needed.
4 Slide reduction for n ≥ 2k
We now introduce a generalized version of slide reduction for lattices with any rank n ≥ 2k. As
we explained in Section 1.2, at a high level, our generalization of the definition from [GN08] is
the same as the original, except that (1) our first block B[1,k+q] is bigger than the others (out of
necessity, since we can no longer divide our basis evenly into disjoint blocks of size k); and (2)
we only η-HSVP reduce the first block (since we cannot afford to δ-SVP reduce a block with size
larger than k). Thus, our notion of slide reduction can be restated as “the first block and the first
dual block are η-(D)HSVP reduced and the rest of the basis B[k+q+1,n] is slide-reduced in the sense
of [GN08].”5
However, the specific value of η that we choose in our definition below might look unnatural at
first. We first present the definition and then explain where η comes from.
5Apart from the approximation factor δ, there is one minor difference between our primal conditions and those
of [GN08]. We only require the primal blocks to be SVP-reduced, while [GN08] required them to be HKZ-reduced,
which is a stronger condition. It is clear from the proof in [GN08] that only SVP reduction is required, as was
observed in [MW16].
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Definition 4.1 (Slide reduction). Let n, k, p, q be integers such that n = pk + q with p, k ≥ 2 and
0 ≤ q ≤ k − 1, and let δ ≥ 1. A basis B ∈ Rm×n is (δ, k)-slide-reduced if it is size-reduced and
satisfies the following three sets of conditions.
1. Mordell conditions: The block B[1,k+q] is η-HSVP-reduced and the block B[2,k+q+1] is η-
DHSVP-reduced for η := (δ2γk)
k+q−1
2(k−1) .
2. Primal conditions: for all i ∈ [1, p− 1], the block B[ik+q+1,(i+1)k+q] is δ-SVP-reduced.
3. Dual conditions: for all i ∈ [1, p− 2], the block B[ik+q+2,(i+1)k+q+1] is δ-DSVP-reduced.6
There are two ways to explain our specific choice of η. Most simply, notice that the output of
the DBKZ algorithm—due to [MW16] and presented in Section 2.4—is η-HSVP reduced when the
input basis has rank k+q (up to some small slack ε). In other words, one reason that we choose this
value of η is because we actually can η-HSVP reduce a block of size k+q efficiently with access to a
δ-SVP oracle for lattices with rank k. If we could do better, then we would in fact obtain a better
algorithm, but we do not know how. Second, this value of η is natural in this context because
it is the choice that “makes the final approximation factor for HSVP match the approximation
factor for the first block.” I.e., the theorem below shows that when we plug in this value of η, a
slide-reduced basis of rank n is (δ2γk)
n−1
2(k−1) -HSVP, which nicely matches the approximation factor
of η = (δ2γk)
k+q−1
2(k−1) -HSVP that we need for the first block (whose rank is k + q). At a technical
level, this is captured by Fact 2.1 and Lemma 2.2.
Of course, the fact that these two arguments suggest the same value of η is not a coincidence.
Both arguments are essentially disguised proofs of Mordell’s inequality, which says that γn ≤
γ
(n−1)/(k−1)
k for 2 ≤ k ≤ n. E.g., with δ = 1 the primal Mordell condition says that b1 yields a
witness to Mordell’s inequality for B[1,k+q].
Theorem 4.2. For any δ ≥ 1, k ≥ 2, and n ≥ 2k, if B = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Rm×n is a (δ, k)-slide-
reduced basis of a lattice L, then
‖b1‖ ≤ (δ2γk)
n−1
2(k−1)vol(L)1/n . (5)
Furthermore, if λ1(L(B[1,k+q])) > λ1(L) , then
‖b1‖ ≤ δ(δ2γk)
n−k
k−1 λ1(L) , (6)
where 0 ≤ q ≤ k − 1 is such that n = pk + q.
Proof. Let d := k+ q. Theorem A.1 of Appendix A shows that B[d+1,n] is both (δ
2γk)
n−d−1
2(k−1) -HSVP-
reduced and (δ2γk)
n−d−k
(k−1) -SVP-reduced. (We relegate this theorem and its proof to the appendix
because it is essentially just a restatement of [GN08, Theorem 1], since B[d+1,n] is effectively just
a slide-reduced basis in the original sense of [GN08].) Furthermore, B[1,d+1] is (δ
2γk)
d−1
2(k−1) -twin-
reduced, so that ‖b1‖ ≤ (δ2γk)
d
k−1 ‖b∗d+1‖. Applying Lemma 2.2 then yields both Eq. (5) and
Eq. (6).
6When p = 2, there are simply no dual conditions.
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4.1 The slide reduction algorithm for n ≥ 2k
We now present our slight generalization of Gama and Nguyen’s slide reduction algorithm that
works for all n ≥ 2k. Our proof that the algorithm runs in polynomial time (excluding oracle calls)
is essentially identical to the proof in [GN08].
Algorithm 3 The slide-reduction algorithm for n ≥ 2k
Input: Block size k ≥ 2, slack ε > 0, approximation factor δ ≥ 1, basis B = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Zm×n of a
lattice L of rank n = pk + q ≥ 2k for 0 ≤ q ≤ k − 1, and access to a δ-SVP oracle for lattices with rank
k.
Output: A ((1 + ε)δ, k)-slide-reduced basis of L(B).
1: while vol(B[1,ik+q])
2 is modified by the loop for some i ∈ [1, p− 1] do
2: (1 + ε)η-HSVP-reduce B[1,k+q] using Alg. 1 for η := (δ
2γk)
k+q−1
2(k−1) .
3: for i = 1 to p− 1 do
4: δ-SVP-reduce B[ik+q+1,(i+1)k+q].
5: end for
6: if B[2,k+q+1] is not (1 + ε)η-DHSVP-reduced then
7: (1 + ε)1/2η-DHSVP-reduce B[2,k+q+1] using Alg. 1.
8: end if
9: for i = 1 to p− 2 do
10: Find a new basis C := (b1, . . . ,bik+q+1, cik+q+2, . . . , c(i+1)k+q+1,bik+q+2, . . . ,bn) of L by δ-DSVP-
reducing B[ik+q+2,(i+1)k+q+1].
11: if (1 + ε)‖b∗(i+1)k+q+1‖ < ‖c∗(i+1)k+q+1‖ then
12: B← C.
13: end if
14: end for
15: end while
16: return B.
Theorem 4.3. For ε ∈ [1/poly(n), 1], Algorithm 3 runs in polynomial time (excluding oracle calls),
makes polynomially many calls to its δ-SVP oracle, and outputs a ((1 + ε)δ, k)-slide-reduced basis
of the input lattice L.
Proof. First, notice that if Algorithm 3 terminates, then its output is ((1 + ε)δ, k)-slide-reduced.
So, we only need to argue that the algorithm runs in polynomial time (excluding oracle calls).
Let B0 ∈ Zm×n be the input basis and let B ∈ Zm×n denote the current basis during the
execution of Algorithm 3. As is common in the analysis of basis reduction algorithms [LLL82,
GN08, LN14], we consider an integral potential of the form
P (B) :=
p−1∏
i=1
vol(B[1,ik+q])
2 ∈ Z+.
The initial potential satisfies logP (B0) ≤ 2n2 · log ‖B0‖, and every operation in Algorithm 3 either
preserves or significantly decreases P (B). In particular, the potential is unaffected by the primal
steps (i.e., Steps 2 and 4), which leave vol(B[1,ik+q]) unchanged for all i. The dual steps (i.e., Steps 7
and 12) either leave vol(B[1,ik+q]) for all i or decrease P (B) by a multiplicative factor of at least
(1 + ε).
15
Therefore, Algorithm 2 updates vol(B[1,ik+q]) for some i at most logP (B0)/ log(1 + ε) times.
Hence, it makes at most 4pn2 log ‖B0‖/ log(1 + ε) calls to the SVP oracle in the SVP and DSVP
reduction steps (i.e., Steps 4 and 12), and similarly at most 4n2 log ‖B0‖/ log(1 + ε) calls to Algo-
rithm 1. From the complexity statement in Section 2.3, it follows that Algorithm 2 runs efficiently
(excluding the running time of oracle calls), as needed.
Corollary 4.4. For any constant c ≥ 1 and δ := δ(n) ≥ 1, there is an efficient reduction from
O(δ2c+1nc)-SVP on lattices with rank n to δ-SVP on lattices with rank k := bn/(c+ 1)c.
Proof. On input (a basis for) an integer lattice L ⊆ Zm with rank n, the reduction first calls
Algorithm 3 to compute a ((1+ε)δ, k)-slide-reduced basis B = (b1, · · · ,bn) of L with, say, ε = 1/n.
Then, the reduction uses the procedure from Corollary 3.4 on the lattice L(B[1,2k]) with c = 1
(i.e., slide reduction on a lattice with rank 2k), to find a vector v ∈ L(B[1,2k]) with 0 < ‖v‖ ≤
O(δ3n)λ1(L(B[1,2k])). Finally, the reduction outputs the shorter of the two vectors b1 and v.
It is immediate from Corollary 3.4 and Theorem 4.3 that this reduction is efficient. To prove
correctness, we consider two cases.
First, suppose that λ1(L(B[1,k+q])) = λ1(L). Then,
‖v‖ ≤ O(δ3n)λ1(L(B[1,2k])) ≤ O(δ2c+1nc)λ1(L) ,
so that the algorithm will output a O(δ2c+1nc)-approximate shortest vector.
On the other hand, if λ1(L(B[1,k+q])) > λ1(L), then by Theorem 4.2, we have
‖b1‖ ≤ (1 + ε)δ((1 + ε)2δ2γk)
n−k
k−1 λ1(L) ≤ O(δ2c+1nc) ,
so that the algorithm also outputs a O(δ2c+1nc)-approximate shortest vector in this case.
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A Properties of Gama and Nguyen’s slide reduction
In the theorem below, B[d+1,n] is essentially just a slide-reduced basis in the sense of [GN08]. So,
the following is more-or-less just a restatement of [GN08, Theorem 1].
Theorem A.1. Let B = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Rm×n with n = pk + d for some p ≥ 1 and d ≥ k be
(δ, k)-slide reduced in the sense of Definition 4.1. Then,
‖b∗d+1‖ ≤ (δ2γk)ik/(k−1)‖b∗ik+d+1‖ for 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1 , (7)
‖b∗d+1‖ ≤ (δ2γk)
n−d−1
2(k−1) vol(B[d+1,n])
1/(n−d) , and (8)
‖bd+1‖ ≤ δ(δ2γk)
n−d−k
k−1 λ1(L(B[d+1,n])) . (9)
Proof. By definition, for each i ∈ [0, p−2], the block B[ik+d+1,(i+1)k+d+1] is δ√γk-twin reduced. By
Eq. (3) of Fact 2.1, we see that
‖b(i−1)k+d+1‖ ≤ (δ
√
γk)
2k/(k−1)‖b∗ik+d+1‖ ,
which implies (7) by induction.
We prove (8) and (9) by induction over p. If p = 1, then both inequalities hold as B[d+1,n] is
δ-SVP reduced by the definition of slide reduction. Now, assume that Eqs. (8) and (9) hold for
p − 1 ≥ 1. Then B satisfies the requirements of the theorem with d′ := d + k and p′ := p − 1.
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, we have
‖b∗d+k+1‖ ≤ (δ2γk)
n−d−k−1
2(k−1) vol(B[d+k+1,n])
1/(n−d−k) , and
‖bd+k+1‖ ≤ δ(δ2γk)
n−3k−`
k−1 λ1(L(B[k+d+1,n])) .
Since B[d+1,d+k] is δ
√
γk-HSVP reduced, we may apply Lemma 2.2, which proves (8) for B[d+1,n].
Furthermore, if λ1(L(B[d+1,n])) < λ1(L(B[d+1,d+k+1])), then B[d+1,n] is δ′-SVP-reduced for
δ′ = (δ2γk)k/(k−1) · δ(δ2γk)
n−d−k
k−1 = δ(δ2γk)
n−d−k
k−1 ,
as needed. If not, then λ1(L(B[d+1,n])) = λ1(L(B[d+1,d+k+1])), and ‖b1‖ ≤ δλ1(L(B[d+1,n])) because
B[d+1,d+k+1] is δ-SVP reduced. In all cases, we proved (9).
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